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Appeal from the District Court of the Sixth Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in and
for the County of Bannock, Honorable Robert C. Naftz, presiding.
I.

A.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Statement of the Case

This case presents a question of proper boundaries of the discretionary function immunity
found in section 6-904(a) of the Idaho Tort Claims and, specifically, the extent to which the State
can rely on "budget cuts" to immunize itself from actions that impact the health and safety of its
citizens. This case also presents a question of whether the judiciary may enforce a victim's
rights guaranteed by Article I, Section 22 of the Idaho Constitution and codified in Section
19-5306, Idaho Code, or whether such rights are simply suggestions for state agencies to follow
at their whim.
B.

Statement of Facts

Gerald Durk Simpson, a diagnosed paranoid schizophrenic, had been receiving mental
health services through the State of Idaho's Department of Health and Welfare for most of his
adult life. R. 169, 173, 177, 179. Among other things, the department's services to Simpson,
who lived by himself, included ensuring that he took the medications required to control his
schizophrenia and helping perform simple activities of daily living, such as grocery shopping. R.
182. For reasons not yet fully explained, in 2009 department officials saw Simpson walking
through town with a gun and found the event significant enough that they took and posted
pictures in the local office. R. 183, 190, 191, 179.
In August of 2010, Simpson received a letter from the State telling him he no longer
qualified for services he had been receiving for most of his adult life because the program was
designed for only short term treatment. R. 102. There is no evidence that Simpson or his family
was advised, prior to receiving this termination letter, that he would no longer be receiving the
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mental health services that he had relied on most of his adult life. See generally, Record. Less
than two months later, on September 27, 2010, Simpson walked out of the front door of his home
and shot at Ryan Mitchell (R. 111 ), who was starting his motorcycle at the coffee shop across the
street. One of the bullets pierced Mitchell through his back, breaking several ribs, puncturing his
lung, and barely missing his heart. R. 12.

Simpson walked back into his home, cleaned,

reloaded, and stored his gun, and went about his business. R. 31. The following day, local law
enforcement arrested Simpson for the shooting. R. 32. Approximately ten days later, on behalf
of the State Department of Health and Welfare, psychologist Daniel Traughber, Ph.D. prepared a
memorandum explaining the processes and procedures that were used in implementing the
budget cuts so that patient mental health services would be terminated in a way that reduced the
risk of harm to patients and/or the community (the "Traughber Memorandum"). R. I 00. There
is no evidence that anyone at the State followed the processes and procedures outlined in the
Traughber Memorandum with respect to terminating Simpson's mental health services. See
generally, Record.
On September 30, 2010, the Bannock County Prosecuting Attorney's Office filed a
charge of Aggravated Battery against Simpson (I.C. §§ 18-903(a), 18-907(l)(a) & (b)) with
notice that the State would seek an enhancement penalty for the use of a deadly weapon in the
commission of a crime (LC. § 18-2520):
That the said GERALD DURK SIMPSON, in the County
of Bannock, State of Idaho, on or about the 27th day of September,
2010, did willfully and unlawfully use force or violence upon the
person of another, Ryan Mitchell, by either the use of a deadly
weapon or instrument and/or causing great bodily harm or
permanent disability or permanent disfigurement by shooting Ryan
Mitchell in the back.

R. 194, 195. Even though the Aggravated Battery charge was still pending against Simpson, the
State of Idaho initiated a plan for the purpose of obtaining the release of Simpson.
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R. 37-38.

Specifically, on May 3, 2012, the State, through the State Attorney General's Office, filed a
Petition on behalf of Simpson' to have a Conservator/Guardian appointed for Simpson so that he
could be released from State custody. R. 168-171.
The State never notified Mitchell (i) that it had initiated the action in the District Court
for Bingham County on behalf of Simpson, (ii) that it was representing Simpson in the District
Court for Bingham County, (iii) that the proceeding in the District Court for Bingham County
could result in the release of Simpson from State custody or (iv) that the proceeding in the
District Court for Bingham County could result in the dismissal of the criminal charges against
Simpson. R. 183-184, 204, 214-215. It is believed that Simpson was released from the State of
Idaho's custody on or around August 20, 2012. R. 39. The criminal charges against Simpson in
Bannock County were dismissed on August 30, 2012. R. 38. Shortly after learning that Simpson
had been released from custody and would not be prosecuted for shooting and nearly killing him,
Mitchell filed this lawsuit. R. 10.
C.

The Proceedings Below

This matter comes to this court on appeal of an order granting summary judgment against
Plaintiff Ryan Mitchell and in favor of the State of Idaho dismissing Counts I, II, and V of
Mitchell's Complaint. Counts I and II of Mitchell's complaint seek declaratory and injunctive
relief against the State for the State's violations of Mitchell's rights under Idaho's constitutional
and statutory victim's rights provisions; in particular, for failure to notify Mitchell of its
decisions to allow charges against Simpson to be dropped and for arranging for Simpson to be
released from custody. Count V of Mitchell's Complaint seeks money damages from the State
for its negligent or reckless acts related to the manner in which the State terminated Simpson's
mental health services.

1

Simpson, by and through his sister as his court appointed guardian,

In re Simpson, Idaho State District Court for Bingham County, No. CV-2012-0862
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allowed Mitchell to take default judgment against him for damages in excess of $500,000.00.
Bannock County has settled with Mitchell. Mitchell's claims against Simpson and Bannock
County are not involved in this appeal.
II.

ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

A.

Under section 9-604(a) of the Idaho Tort Claims Act, does discretionary function
immunity shield operational decision makers from liability for negligently or recklessly
failing to follow policies and procedures that were developed in response to budget cuts.

B.

Under Article I, Section 22 of the Idaho Constitution and/or Idaho Code Section 19-5306
does a private individual have the right to use the judicial process to seek recognition and
enforcement of his victims' rights when they have otherwise been ignored by the State.

III.
A.

ARGUMENT

The District Court Erred When it Classified the Decision to Terminate Simpson's
Mental Health Services as a Discretionary Function, Barring any Tort Claim.

The district court erred in holding that discretionary function immunity barred Mitchell's
tort claims against the State because the district court incorrectly attributed the decision to
terminate Simpson's mental health services to broad based policy decisions made in response to
budget cuts. The evidence presented by the State in support of its motion for summary judgment
demonstrates that the decision to terminate Simpson's mental health services was an operational
level decision that was not made in accordance with the State's policies and procedures.
Additionally, the evidence the district court relied on to grant discretionary function immunity
was inadmissible. For either or both of these reasons, the district court should have denied the
State's motion for summary judgment.
i.

The district court failed to identify the precise nature of the conduct about
which Mitchell complained before it reached the conclusion that the State's
decision was entitled to discretionary function immunity.

The most significant error made by the district court in its holding that discretionary
function immunity barred Mitchell's claims against the State was the conclusion that budget cuts
immunized all actions relating to termination of individual patients' mental health services
APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF - 4

without first identifying whether the decisions or actions were planning or operational. In order
to properly apply discretionary function immunity, the court must determine if the precise
conduct about which the plaintiff complains is planning or operational. Sterling v. Bloom, 111
Idaho 211, 230, 723 P.2d 755, 774 (1986).

The planning/operations distinction, which was

developed by the United States Supreme Court and adopted by this Court, makes clear that the
only activities properly classified as discretionary functions for purposes of 6-904(a) are those
"activities which involve[] the establishment of plans, specifications and schedules where there
is room for policy judgment and decision." Id. at 229-230, 723 P.2d at 773-74. Once policies or
procedures are set, the actions and decisions involved in implementing and carrying out those
policies or procedures are properly classified as operational functions.

Jones v. City of St.

Maries, 111 Idaho 733, 736, 727 P.2d 1161, 1164 (1986). Importantly, for purposes of applying
discretionary function immunity, the "exercise of discretion" does not involve any decision that
involves judgment or choice:
. . . virtually all human endeavors, even the driving of a nail,
involve some type of discretion as commonly defined. Clearly,
then, "discretionary function" does not include functions which
involve any element of choice, judgment or ability to make
responsible decisions; otherwise every function would fall within
the exception.
Sterling, 111 Idaho at 227, 723 P.2d at 771 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original). That is to
say, discretionary function immunity applies only when it involves planning decisions, not when
it involves operational decisions. If the matter complained of is an operational function, as is the
case here, the State is not immune for failure to exercise due or ordinary care. Id. at 230, 723 P.
2d at 774.
Because discretionary function immunity turns on the planning/operational distinction
described at length in Sterling v. Bloom, the court must first precisely identify the complained of
conduct so that it can determine if the conduct is a planning or operational function.
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In Jones v.

City of St. Maries, this Court provided examples highlighting the importance of precisely

identifying the complained of conduct before attempting to apply discretionary function
immunity. Jones involved complaints that the city negligently maintained fire hydrants, thereby
causing a delay in fire-fighting efforts. 111 Idaho at 736, 727 P.2d at 1164. This Court noted
that the plaintiffs' allegations of negligent maintenance were not enough to determine the precise
nature of the complained of conduct and, accordingly, did not provide the Court with enough
information upon which it could decide whether discretionary function immunity would apply.
Id.

The Jones Court then explained that if the evidence showed that the City had made a
broad policy decision, for budgetary or other reasons, not to inspect water mains and fire
hydrants, then the complaints of negligent maintenance would relate to a discretionary function.
Id But, if the evidence showed that the City made a policy decision to assume a duty to inspect

and the complaints of negligent maintenance related to the manner in which the City
implemented its duty to inspect, then the complaints would relate to operational functions. Id at
736-37, 727 P.2d at 1164-65.
The planning/operational test provides immunity for planning
act1v1t1es
activities which involve the establishment of plans,
specifications and schedules where there is room for policy
judgments and decision.
Operational activities-activities
involving the implementation of statutory and regulatory policyare not immunized and, accordingly, must be performed with
ordinary care.
Id at 735-36, 727 P.2d at 1163-64.

Accordingly, in order to apply discretionary function

immunity properly, a court must first precisely identify the complained of conduct and then
determine whether such complaints relate to the development of policies, processes or
procedures (which conduct is properly classified as discretionary functions) or whether the
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complaints relate to the implementation of those policies, processes or procedures (which
conduct is properly classified as operational functions).
In this matter, the evidence presented to and relied upon by the district court shows that,
in response to budget cuts, the State made a policy decision to reduce the number of patients
receiving state services and, accordingly, developed processes and procedures for implementing
the budget cuts by terminating some patients' services. R. 100, 105-106. However, with respect
to terminating Simpson's mental health services, there is no evidence showing that the State
followed the processes or procedures at all or otherwise exercised due care in implementing
and/or carrying out those processes and procedures.

See generally, Record.

Accordingly,

because the termination of Simpson's mental health services involved the intentional, reckless,
and/or negligent failure to implement the policies and procedures, the termination of Simpson's
mental health services was operational and the State is not entitled to discretionary function
immunity.
Specifically, in support of its motion for summary judgment, the State claimed that the
October 8, 2010, memorandum regarding the July 2010 Closure of ACT Team Clients, the
Traughber Memorandum, outlined the process to be used at the operational level to terminate
mental health services for certain patients. 2 R. 91. The Traughber Memorandum3 begins by
making it clear that the processes and procedures were developed in an effort to "reduce the
possibility of harm to clients and/or the community." R. 100. The Traghber Memorandum then
describes the process:

2

To be clear, this memorandum was prepared after Simpson's mental health services were terminated and after
Mitchell was shot, apparently in an effort to justify actions that had already been taken. As such, is may be suspect,
but it provides the only evidence before the district court affecting the question of discretionary function immunity.
3 Pursuant to Idaho R. Evid. 80l(d)(2), because Traughber is an agent of the State and the contents of the Traugbher
Memorandum are statements concerning material within the scope of his agency relationship that were made during
the existence of that agency relationship, the Statements contained within the Traughber Memorandum are not
hearsay when offered by Mitchell against the State. The State, however, is required to qualify those statements
under an exception to the hearsay rule in order to use them in its affirmative case.
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Specifically, the ACT Team, who at the time was being supervised
by Daniel Traughber, closely examined the open clients. Each
client was staffed on several occasions. In fact, most of the ACT
Team client cases were staffed multiple times a week during the
six weeks leading up to the closure. Of note, is that ACT Team
clients who were ultimately closed had ability to pay for private
services, access to services, and demonstrated a level of stability
that indicated ACT Team level services were not necessary.
Further, if an individual appeared to meet these criteria and yet a
clinician, case manager, or the client themselves felt strongly that
discontinuing ACT Team services would result in serious
problems, they were removed from the possible closure list (which
occurred in several cases).
R. 100. The broad policy decision to reduce the number of patients being served is similar to the
hypothetical in Jones where the City-for budgetary or other reasons-elects not to inspect or
maintain the fire hydrants. Accordingly, the decision to reduce the number of patients receiving
mental health services is properly characterized as a discretionary function.
Critically, however, the court's analysis does not and should not end there. Once policies,
processes, and procedures are set, their implementation is an operational function. Stated
differently, once the State makes a policy decision to assume a duty to terminate services in such
a way as to "reduce the possibility of harm to clients and/or the community" (R. 100), it must
carry out that duty in a non-negligent manner. Jones, 111 Idaho at 737, 727 P.2d at 1165 ("If, on
the other hand, the evidence indicates that the city had, in fact, assumed the responsibility for
inspecting and maintaining the fire hydrants and water mains at issue, then it would be obligated
to perform those activities with due care and would be correspondingly liable for any failure to
do so."). In this case, the State made the policy decision to terminate patients' services in a
manner that reduced harm to the patients themselves and the community and developed a
specific process to be followed to reduce the potential for harm.

R. 100.

The Traughber

Memorandum outlined processes and procedures which state actors were to have followed, caseby-case, with respect to each patient. R. 100. Because the actual implementation of these
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processes and procedures is an operational function, the State was required to use due care and
act in accordance with the policies and procedures set forth in the Traughber Memorandum when
processing each individual case, including Simpson's case.
The district court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of the State because it
only conducted half of the analysis. In support of its decision to grant summary judgment, the
district court paraphrased a portion of the Jones decision, stating:
The Idaho Supreme Court has specifically explained that if the
evidence indicates that a policy decision was made 'due to
budgetary constraints or other factors ... such a decision would be
discretionary, as it would involve planning rather than operational
activity, and the city would be immune from liability even if the
decision was negligently made." Jones v. City of St. Maries, 111
Idaho 733, 736-37, 727 P.2d 1161, 1164-65 (1986).
R. 483. But the district court failed to acknowledge and, therefore, otherwise ignored the very
next sentence in Jones which reads:
If, on the other hand, the evidence indicates that the city had, in
fact, assumed the responsibility for inspecting and maintaining the
fire hydrants and water mains at issue, then it would be obligated
to perform those activities with due care and would be
correspondingly liable for any failure to do so.

Jones, 111 Idaho at 737, 727 P.2d at 1165. Accordingly, in reliance on that portion of Jones that
states policy decisions made in response to budget cuts are discretionary and entitled to
immunity, the district court then jumped immediately to the conclusion that any action that could
be traced to budget cuts was entitled to discretionary function immunity. R. 483-84. In this
partial analysis, the district court simply looked to the fact that the State, in response to budget
cuts, had to modify its selection criteria for determining who received mental health services and
then characterized every decision falling within the umbrella of that broad policy decision,
ignoring the more specific question of whether the termination of Simpson's mental health
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services was carried out in accordance with the policies and procedures outlined in the Traughber
Memorandum.
The district court's conclusion that "budget cuts played a major role in the closure of Mr.
Simpson's case file" ignored the second part of the analysis presented in Jones. As noted in
Jones, if the State assumed a duty to close files and terminate services with some patients and not

others, and to do so using processes and procedures designed to reduce the potential harm to
patients and/or the community, and the evidence shows that the State did not follow its own
processes for closing Simpson's file, then the State would be subject to tort liability. Because the
district court failed to apply the planning/operational distinction, it improperly classified the
decision to terminate Simpson's mental health services as a discretionary function and such
decision should be overruled.
ii.

There is insufficient evidence in the record to support a conclusion that the
termination of Simpson's mental health services was made in accordance
with the Traughber Memorandum.

The precise nature of Mitchell's complaints against the State is not that it was negligent
in discretionary planning relating to budget cuts, but rather that it was negligent (perhaps grossly
negligent, reckless, or intentionally ignored procedures) at the operational level when
implementing those plans. Had the district court undertaken the proper analysis and looked
precisely at whether the State followed its own processes and procedures when terminating
Simpson's mental health services, it would have concluded that it had not acted with due care
and in accordance with the Traughber processes and procedures.

Rather, the State either

altogether ignored its own processes and procedures or was negligent (or even grossly negligent)
in the implementation of those processes and procedures.
With respect to the termination of Simpson's mental health services, there is no evidence
in the record that the State used due care or even that it followed the processes and procedures
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outlined in the Traughber Memorandum.

Indeed, contrary to the processes and procedures

outlined in the Traughber Memorandum, there is no evidence in the record of what, if anything,
the ACT Team did to "closely examine" Simpson; there is no evidence that Simpson was
"staffed on several occasions" or that Simpson was "staffed multiple times a week during the six
weeks leading up to the closure;" there is no evidence that the ACT Team took into account
Simpsons' "ability to pay for private services", Simpsons "access to services", or whether
Simpson "demonstrated a level of stability that indicated that ACT Team level services were not
necessary." Cf R. 100 (Traughber Memorandum). Significantly, there is no evidence in the
record that the ACT Team engaged with Simpson or his family members to gain an
understanding of whether Simpson himself "felt strongly that discontinuing ACT Team services
would result in serious problems." Cf R. 100 (Traughber Memorandum). In short, there is no
evidence in the record that any of the procedures outlined in the Traughber Memorandum were
ever followed with respect to Simpson.
Not only is there no evidence that the State used due care in implementing the processes
and procedures outlined in the Traughber Memorandum, the evidence presented to and relied
upon by the district court shows that-with respect to Simpson-the processes and procedures
outlined in the Traughber Memorandum were completely disregarded. Rather than engaging in a
case-by-case assessment outlined in the Traughber Memorandum, the evidence in the record
shows that, with respect to Simpson, the State took a man with a diagnosis of paranoid
schizophrenia (R. 169) for which the State had been providing mental health services to for most
of his adult life (R. 177), a man who the State knew to be medically non-compliant (R. 182), a
man who the State knew had access to guns (R. 183, 190, 191, 179), and to this man, the State
sent a form letter telling him that the mental health services he had received for most of his adult
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life were being terminated because the program was designed to serve people for only a short
term and he no longer qualified (R. 102).
As the foregoing demonstrates, the district court's conclusion that the State was entitled
to discretionary function immunity was erroneous because the district court failed to precisely
identify whether the termination of Simpson's mental health services was the result of
development of processes and procedures or the negligent implementation of those processes and
procedures. The evidence detailed above demonstrates that the State did not follow its own
processes and procedures when terminating Simpson's services and, indeed, appears to have
misrepresented and/or failed to fully explain to Simpson why his services were being terminated
and what, if anything he could to do to prevent it from happening. Because there is no evidence
that shows that the State even attempted to follow the processes and procedures outlined in the
Traughber Memorandum, the State was, at a minimum, negligent in the manner in which it
terminated Simpson's mental health services. To uphold the district court's decision-which
focuses solely on the State's need to adjust to budget cuts-would be to immunize the State for
any and every action that could somehow be connected to policy adjustments resulting from
budget cuts; that is to say, to hold otherwise would be to immunize the State for any and every
action.
Because the State did not exercise due care or even attempt to follow the Traughber
processes and procedures when terminating Simpson's mental health services, Mitchell
respectfully requests that this Court reverse that portion of the district courts order dismissing the
tort claims found in Count V of his Complaint.
iii.

The Court's conclusion that the decision to terminate Simpson's services was
based on budget cuts is not supported by admissible evidence.

In support of its argument that the decision to terminate Simpson's mental health services

was related to budget cuts and, therefore, entitled to discretionary function immunity, the State
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submitted two affidavits made by persons who were not competent to testify to the matters
contained in such affidavits. Although Mitchell has relied upon one of those affidavits for the
purposes of the Traughber Memorandum discussed above, Appellant nonetheless argues,
alternatively, that these affidavits were inadmissible for the purpose of the State's case and
should not have been relied upon by the district court to support its decision. Because the district
court relied upon such evidence when granting the State's motion for summary judgment on
Mitchell's tort claims, there is an additional basis upon which this Court can reverse the district
court's decision.
Neither of the affidavits submitted by the State in support of its motion for summary
judgment met the standards set forth in Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e). On a motion for
summary judgment, Rule 56(e) requires that "[s]upporting and opposing affidavits shall be made
on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall
show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein." I.R.C.P.
56(e). This Court has explained:
The requirements of Rule 56(e) are not satisfied by an affidavit
that is conclusory, based on hearsay, and not supported by personal
knowledge. Only material contained in affidavits or depositions
that is based upon personal knowledge or that is admissible at trial
will be considered by this Court.
Smith v. Board of Corrections, 133 Idaho 519,523,988 P.2d 1193, 1197 (1999).

No consideration or weight should have been given to the Jodi Osborn Affidavit because
it is does not state that it is based upon her personal knowledge and, even if such personal
knowledge is assumed, because it does not contain evidence admissible on other grounds. R.
107-108. Specifically, the affidavit does not indicate whether she was employed with the State
at the time the facts set forth in her complaint occurred, nor does she describe how she became
aware of the purported facts contained in her affidavit after she became employed. R. 107-08.
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Finally, Osborn does not make any effort to connect her statement regarding fiscal 2009 and
2010 budget cuts with the manner in which the State terminated Simpson's mental health
services. Because the Osborn Affidavit does not demonstrate that it would be admissible at trial,
it was error for the district court to consider and rely on that affidavit as a basis to grant summary
judgment.
The district court should also not have considered the Sue Chadwick Affidavit because it
is an attempt to authenticate documents which cannot be properly authenticated by Chadwick.
Chadwick, who identifies herself as office services supervisor for the State, purported to
authenticate and introduce three documents that she did not author and which were, therefore,
hearsay.

R. 97.

See Idaho. R. Evid. 802.

In order for these documents to be properly

considered, the State was required to demonstrate that an exception to the hearsay rule applies.
Idaho R. Evid. 802. The Chadwick Affidavit does not establish the foundation necessary to
properly apply any exception to the hearsay rule.
Over Mitchell's objections, the district court erroneously found that the documents
submitted under the Chadwick Affidavit were admissible under the business records exception to
the hearsay rule. R. 4 72. The business records exception provides as follows:
Records of regularly conducted activity. A memorandum, report,
record, or data compilation, in any form, of acts, events, conditions,
opinions, or diagnoses, made at or near the time by, or from
information transmitted by, a person with knowledge, if kept in the
course of a regularly conducted business activity, and if it was the
regular practice of that business activity to make the memorandum,
report, record, or data compilation, all as shown by the testimony of
the custodian or other qualified witness, or by certification that
complies with Rule 902(11), unless the source of information or the
method or circumstances of preparation indicate lack of
trustworthiness.

Idaho R. Evid. 803(6). Contrary to the contents of the Chadwick Affidavit and the district
court's conclusion, the business record exception is not a catch-all that allows admission of any
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document that can be said to have been found in the files of a private or public "business."
Rather, as this Court has noted,
The general requirements for the admission of business records are
that the documents be 'produced in the ordinary course of
business, at or near the time of occurrence and not in anticipation
of trial.' Beco Corp. v. Roberts & Sons Constr. Co., 114 Idaho
704, 711, 760 P.2d 1120, 1127 (1988). These foundational
requirements 'supply the degree of trustworthiness necessary to
justify an exception to the rule against hearsay.' Id It is necessary
that the circumstances behind the creation of the business records
'impl[y] a high degree of veracity.' Christensen v. Rice, 114 Idaho
929, 934, 763 P.2d 302,307 (Ct.App. 1988).
Hurtado v. Land O'Lakes, Inc., 147 Idaho 813,815,215 PJd 533,535 (2009).

The Chadwick Affidavit does not establish the foundational requirements for the business
records exception. Chadwick states only that the three documents had been "maintained" by the
State. R. 96-97. Chadwick does not claim that the documents were produced in the ordinary
course of business; Chadwick does not claim that the documents were produced at or near the
time of the occurrence; and Chadwick does not claim that the documents were not created in
anticipation of trial. R. 96-97. The fact that a document may have been located or "maintained"
in the State's files does not, by itself, create an exception to the hearsay rule. Accordingly, it was
improper for the district court to consider the contents and exhibits to the Chadwick Affidavit.

B.

The District Court Erred When It Granted Summary Judgment on the Victim's
Rights Claims.
In granting summary judgment in favor of the State on counts I and II of Mitchell's

Complaint, the district court erroneously held that the victim's rights guaranteed by the Idaho
Constitution, Article I, Section 22 were not self-executing and, accordingly, no private
enforcement mechanisms exist unless and until expressly granted by the legislature. The district
court's interpretation of Idaho's Victim's rights provisions ignores the plain language of
Article I, Section 22 of the Idaho Constitution and the legislature's codification of those rights in
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Section 19-5306, Idaho Code, and misapplies traditional cannons of statutory construction,
thereby rendering such rights meaningless.
This Court has made it clear that, where rights created by the constitution are
self-executing, the legislature is not required to take any further action and courts may grant
relief necessary to enforce the rights created by the constitution.
Constitutional provisions are self-executing when there is a
manifest intention that they should go into immediate effect, and
no ancillary legislation is necessary to the enjoyment of a right
given or the enforcement of a duty imposed.
Haile v. Foote, 90 Idaho 261, 267, 409 P.2d 409, 412 (1965) (citing Cleary v. Kincaid, 23 Idaho

789, 131 P. 1117 (1913)). Contrary to the district court's analysis, this Court has held that "[t]he
fact that a right granted by a constitutional provision may be better or further protected by
supplementary legislation does not of itself prevent the provision from being self-executing." Id
at 269, 409 P.2d at 413. And, indeed, if a statute is self-enacting, a court may grant relief
necessary to enforce the rights and duties imposed. See, id. at 261, 409 P .2d at 409 (granting a
preemptory writ of prohibition to enforce constitutional amendment regarding the election of
sheriffs) and Cleary v. Kincaid, 23 Idaho 789, 131 P. 111 7 ( 1913) (granting a writ of mandate to
enforce constitutional amendment that made the county treasurer instead of the county assessor
the tax collector).
In this case, the plain language of Article I, Section 22 of the Idaho Constitution clearly
and expressly states that the provision is self-executing: "This provision shall be self-enacting."
Accordingly, no additional action by the legislature is required in order for courts of this state to
grant relief necessary to protect the rights and enforce the duties established. Nevertheless, the
Idaho Legislature enacted Idaho Code Section 19-5306 recognizing those rights and by use of the
word "shall" in subsection (1), made it clear that the duty to protect victim's rights was

mandatory. See Bonner County v. Cunningham, 156 Idaho 291,
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323 P.3d 1252, 1258 (Ct.

App. 2014) ("In all cases since Willys Jeep, the Supreme Court has consistently held that the use
of the term "shall" or "must" in a statute is mandatory"). Because the Idaho Constitution's
Victim's Rights provisions are self-executing and because the Idaho legislature has made it clear
that the duty to protect such rights is mandatory, the recognition and enforcement of such rights
can be realized through declaratory or injunctive relief.
In concluding that the legislature was required to provide mechanisms for enforcement of
the victim's rights guaranteed by the Idaho Constitution, Article I, Section 22, the district court
mistakenly relied upon a Nebraska case, - State ex rel. Lamm v. Nebraska Bd. of Pardons, 260
Neb. 1000, 620 N.W.2d 763 (2001), which examined language of the Nebraska Constitution that
is fundamentally different than that found in Idaho's Constitution. Specifically, the Nebraska
provision mandated legislative action by stating that "[t]he Legislature shall provide by law for
the implementation of the rights granted in this section." Lamm, 620 NW.2d at 768. Because
the Nebraska legislature had failed to pass any laws implementing the provision, the Lamm Court
held there were no enforcement mechanisms available.

Conversely, the Idaho Constitution

empowers, but does not require, the Idaho legislature to enact further legislation in order to
protect victim's rights.

Specifically, our constitution provides "This section shall be self-

enacting" and, further, that "The legislature shall have the power to enact laws to defined,
implement, preserve, and expand the rights guaranteed to victims in the provisions of this
section." Idaho Constitution, Article I, Section 22. And, indeed, the Idaho legislature did enact
Section 19-5306 which makes it clear that there is a mandatory duty to protect victim's rights
guaranteed by the Idaho Constitution.
Mitchell's position that declaratory and injunctive relief are available to enforce his
constitutional and statutory rights is further supported by the fact that claims for money damages
and attorney's fees are expressly excluded.
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First, under the cannon of construction "expressio

unius est exclusio alterius," the inclusion of certain enumerated items implies the exclusion of
those things which are not specifically listed. See, e.g., State v. Michael 111 Idaho 930, 933, 729
P.2d 405, 408 (1986). The Constitutional provision and statute eliminate the legal remedies of
"money damages" and "attorney's fees" and that exclusion makes equitable relief in the form of
an injunction against future violations even more appropriate. See Thomas v. Campbell, 107
Idaho 398, 404, 690 P.2d 333, 339 (1984) ("there is the established principle of law that equity
will not afford relief to a plaintiff where there is an adequate remedy at law."). Moreover, it has
been previously recognized by this Court that the "[e]quity jurisdiction of the District Court is
not confined to statutory provision for delineation and is not subject to diminution by legislative
acts." Gerlach v. Schultz, 72 Idaho 507, 512, 244 P.2d 1095, 1098 (1952). And, under Idaho's
declaratory rights act, Idaho Courts have broad powers "to declare rights, status and other legal
relations, whether or not further relief is or could be claimed." IDAHO CODE § 10-1201. That is,
this Court can declare Mitchell's "rights" under the Constitutional Crime Victim provision, and
under the Crime Victim Statute, regardless of "whether or not further relief," like money
damages, is available. The fact that the legislature deemed it necessary to specifically exclude
actions for money damages and attorney's fees is an implicit recognition that the rights created
under Idaho's victims' rights provisions can be otherwise enforced through private actions for
declaratory and injunctive relief.
The district court mistakenly relied upon generalizations from an ALR Annotation that
have no relevance to Mitchell's claims for Declaratory Judgment or Injunctive relief-Jay M.
Zitter, Annotation, Validity, Construction and Application of State Constitutional or Statutory
Victim's Bill of Rights, 91 A.L.R.5th 343. (2001). R. 477. However, cases referenced in the
Annotation involved attempts by the crime victim to intervene in the criminal sentencing or
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probationary proceedings. That did not occur here. Here, Mitchell seeks to enforce his rights
through a separate action for declaratory and injunctive relief.
In Mitchell's complaint, neither the first nor the second causes of action seek money
damages from the State. The first cause of action seeks a declaratory judgment. The second
cause of action seeks an injunction, an equitable remedy. Both of these remedies should be
available under the self-executing victims' rights provisions found in the Idaho Constitution as
well as their statutory counterparts found in Idaho Code Section 19-5306. Because the district
court erred in holding that Mitchell could not bring any action to enforce his rights under Idaho's
constitutional and statutory victims' rights provisions, Mitchell respectfully requests that this
Court reverse that portion of the district courts order granting summary judgment in favor of the
State on Counts I and II.

IV. CONCLUSION
For the forgoing reasons, Mitchell respectfully requests that this Court enter an order
reversing the decision of the district court that granted summary judgment in favor of the State
on Counts I, II, and V of Mitchell's Complaint.
Dated

of September, 2014.

Respectfully Submitted,
MAUK MILLER & BURGOYNE

FISHER RAINEY HUDSON
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